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We construct an endogenous growth model that includes a cultural variable along the dimension of
individualism-collectivism. The model predicts that more individualism leads to more innovation because
of the social rewards associated with innovation in an individualist culture. This cultural effect may
offset the negative effects of bad institutions on growth. Collectivism leads to efficiency gains relative
to individualism, but these gains are static, unlike the dynamic effect of individualism on growth through
innovation. Using genetic data as instruments for culture we provide strong evidence of a causal effect
of individualism on income per worker and total factor productivity as well as on innovation.  The
baseline genetic markers we use are interpreted as proxies for cultural transmission but others have
a direct effect on individualism and collectivism, in line with recent advances in biology and neuro-science.
The effect of culture on long-run growth remains very robust even after controlling for the effect of
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1.  Introduction 
One of the central questions in economics of growth and development is why disparities in income and 
development across countries are large and persistent. Despite decades of the quest to identify the 
fundamental forces explaining these differences, the question continues to puzzle the profession as the 
bulk of the differences are attributed to variation in productivity. It is widely perceived that the key 
conduit of economic growth and productivity enhancements is innovation that brings new goods and 
services to the economy as well as new ways to produce existing goods and services.  In this paper, we 
argue theoretically and empirically that culture plays a key role in stimulating innovations and hence 
explaining long-run economic growth.    
The idea that culture is a central ingredient of economic development goes back to at least Max 
Weber who, in his classical work “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” argued that the 
protestant ethic of Calvinism was a very powerful force behind the development of capitalism in its early 
phases.  Weber saw culture as the driving force behind differences in economic development. His theory 
was in direct opposition to that of Karl Marx, who viewed culture as determined by the level of economic 
development and the economic interests of the various social classes. Although Landes (1998) and others 
have argued that culture played a fundamental role in explaining the wealth of nations, there has so far 
been little theoretical or empirical work examining the effect of culture on long-run growth and 
development.  
We define culture as the set of values and beliefs people have about how the world (both nature 
and society) works as well as the norms of behavior derived from that set of values. This definition 
highlights that culture affects not only social norms but also economic behavior such as the propensity to 
save or to innovate and many other economic decisions such as fertility choices, investment in education, 
charitable contributions or the willingness to contribute to public goods. Culture is directly related to 
institutions in the sense that culture, like formal political or legal institutions as defined by North (1990), 
imposes constraints on individual behavior. Roland (2004) has argued that culture tends to be more slow-
moving than political or legal institutions. Therefore, one can argue that culture might have an important 
effect on the choice of political and legal institutions itself. One can thus hypothesize that culture is a 
basic force underlying formal institutions and long-run growth. 
In particular, we investigate theoretically and empirically one aspect of culture that may be 
relevant for long-run growth: the difference between individualism and collectivism.  This distinction 
captures only one aspect of differences between cultures across the world but it is considered by cross-
cultural psychologists to be the main dimension of cultural variation (see Heine, 2007) and it potentially 
has important economic effects. For example, Greif (1994, 2006) uses this distinction in his path-breaking 
work showing strong effects of culture on the economic outcomes. 2 
 
We stress several main elements of the difference between individualism and collectivism in our 
theory.  Individualism emphasizes personal freedom and achievement. Individualist culture therefore 
awards social status to personal accomplishments such as important discoveries, innovations or great 
artistic achievements. On the other hand, individualism can make collective action more difficult because 
individuals pursue their own interest without internalizing collective interests. Collectivism makes 
collective action easier in the sense that individuals internalize group interests to a greater degree. 
However, it also encourages conformity and discourages individuals from standing out. This framework 
implies that individualism should encourage innovation, everything else equal, but collectivism should 
have an advantage in coordinating production processes and in various forms of collective action.
1 
We put these ingredients in an endogenous growth model similar in spirit to models developed in 
Aghion and Howitt (1998). The model is standard in many respects. There is a competitive sector 
producing final goods using labor and intermediate inputs. Collectivist culture is assumed to give a 
competitive edge in the production of final goods, but so does a higher quality of intermediate inputs 
which is the result of innovation. Households own the firms producing intermediate inputs and derive 
utility not only from consumption but also from social prestige associated with producing a higher than 
average quality of intermediate products. This social prestige is stronger in individualistic cultures than in 
collectivist cultures. The quality of intermediate inputs is determined by the effort put into research, 
which in turn is a function of the monetary and social status rewards to innovation. The government can 
act in a predatory way by expropriating the rents from innovation. The main result generated by the model 
is that individualism leads to higher long-term growth via stronger incentives to innovate due to the 
culturally induced social rewards. This positive effect of social status rewards may offset the negative 
effects of predatory institutions. Although collectivism generates static efficiency gains, it has no growth 
effects.  
We bring the model to the data by testing the effect of individualism versus collectivism on long-
run growth. Since one can argue that culture might be endogenous to economic outcomes, finding a 
convincing causal effect of culture on long-run growth requires having a valid instrumental variable. Our 
main instrumental variable is a measure of genetic distance between the population in a given country and 
the population in the USA, which happens to be the most individualistic country in our sample. We know 
from Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) and others that parental transmission of culture is a fundamental 
determinant of the cultural values of individuals. Obviously, parents transmit their cultural values as well 
as their genes to their offspring. Populations that interbreed a lot should be genetically close and also 
culturally close because a very similar parental transmission mechanism is at work in both cases. 
                                                            
1 There might also be an advantage of collectivism in terms of public good provision. We do not explore this aspect 
in this paper. 3 
 
Therefore, measures of genetic distance can be seen as a proxy measure of differences in parental 
transmission of cultural values. 
Since there are no identified genetic causes for why some countries became wealthier than others, 
genetic distance is very likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. We strengthen the quality of our 
instrumental variable by using only “neutral” genetic markers (such as from mitochondrial DNA) which 
have no direct effect on genetic fitness. Thus, these markers are excellent instrumental variables (IVs) to 
correct for potential endogeneity of culture. In our baseline specifications we use genetic distance based 
on frequencies of blood types, which is the genetic information available for the largest number of 
countries. We aggregate genetic data from over 2,000 groups of population across the globe and construct 
country-level data using ethnic shares from Fearon (2003) and our data. 
A potential problem with this identification strategy is that there may be multiple channels 
through which these neutral genetic markers are indirectly related to measures of economic performance. 
In an important check, we address this concern by using an alternative set of instrumental variables such 
as information on genes (e.g. the frequency of the S-allele in the serotonin transporter gene 5HTTLPR) 
that, according to recent advances in neuro-science, biology and epidemiology, appear to directly affect 
personality traits and, according to the recent literature in cross-cultural psychology, can explain the 
prevalence of collectivist culture. Although these data cover only a limited sample, this check confirms 
our causal analysis of culture’s effects on long-run on growth. 
Genetic distance data have been used by Guiso et al. (2009) and by Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009) in contexts that are close but different in various respects from the setting of our paper. Their data 
includes a broader set of genes but only for 42 groups across the world. Guiso et al. (2009) interpret 
genetic distance as proxying both cultural and genetic dissimilarity which is a source of a potential bias 
distorting people’s propensity to trust each other and engage in trade. Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) view 
genetic distance as a barrier to the diffusion of technologies as people that are more distant from each 
other will communicate less and thus benefit less from technological innovation.  
Using genetic differences as an instrument for culture, we find a strong causal effect of 
individualism on income per worker, total factor productivity, and innovation as predicted by our theory.  
These results hold even when we exclude the Americas and Oceania where settler colonization played an 
important role. They also hold when controlling for measures of geographic distance, human capital, 
ethnic fractionalization, and other factors affecting growth. While we find an important role for the 
individualism-collectivism dimension of culture in determining long run growth, the measure of 
generalized trust which is also used as a cultural variable in various studies (or as a measure of social 
capital) does not have a robust effect on growth. Moreover, even after controlling for measures of 
institutions which were previously found  (e.g., Hall and Jones, 1999, Acemoglu et al., 2001) to affect 4 
 
long-run growth, culture continues to play a statistically significant and quantitatively important role, 
implying that culture has an effect on economic development that is independent of institutions. 
Furthermore, we find that there is a two-way causality between culture and institutions thus suggesting 
that institutions are in part determined by culture.  
Our results are robust to the introduction of different types of controls and different measures of 
long-run growth as well as to using alternative instrumental variables (also used in Licht et al. (2007) and 
Tabellini (2008a)) based on linguistic properties of individualist cultures. In effect, we examine many 
other potential channels from the literature via which genetic distance might indirectly affect economic 
outcomes and we find that individualism still positively affects innovation and long-run growth after 
controlling for these other potential explanations. Together with the evidence of direct genetic effects on 
culture, these results unambiguously show that culture is empirically relevant for understanding economic 
development and should be included in theories of economic growth. 
Our findings contribute to the nascent literature emphasizing the effects of culture on economic 
outcomes. Using a game theoretical approach, Greif (1994, 2006) studied the effects of individualist 
versus collectivist beliefs on contract formation, social stratification and the expansion of markets in the 
late Medieval trade in the Mediterranean. Bisin and Verdier (2000, 2001) examined the dynamics of 
intergenerational transmission of cultural preferences taking into account family choices of cultural 
transmission and effects of social environment. Tabellini (2008b) studied how the cultural transmission of 
values of cooperation can affect the form of institutions which in turn reinforces norms of cooperative 
behavior. Ashraf and Galor (2007) model the trade-off between non-conformism and conformism at 
different stages of development and provide a theory of why China was richer in the Malthusian stage of 
development but lagged behind in the industrialization stage. Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) developed a 
model to explain the cultural transmission of the values of the pre-industrial middle class (thriftiness, hard 
work) in the industrialization process as well as their eventual social success and the demise of the landed 
aristocracy. Fernandez, Fogli and Olivetti (2004), Fernandez and Fogli (2009) and Giuliano (2007) 
examined the effects of culture on fertility choices, family living arrangements and labor supply 
decisions. Barro and McCleary (2003) argue that economic growth is affected by religious beliefs (e.g., 
existence of hell and heaven). Knack and Keefer (1997) considered the effect of social capital on 
economic performance.
2  Aghion et al. (2008) found a negative correlation between trust and the level of 
regulation in societies. Guiso et al. (2003, 2009) examined the effect of trust on economic attitudes and 
international trade patterns, and Giuliano et al. (2006) investigated the link between geography, genetic 
                                                            
2 Knack and Keefer (1997) use two instrumental variables for trust:  i) the percentage of a country’s population 
belonging to the largest “ethnolinguistic” group, and ii) the number of law students in 1963 as a percentage of all 
postsecondary students. 5 
 
distance, transportation costs and economic variables. Tabellini (2008a) and Licht et al. (2007) provide 
evidence of a causal link from culture to institutions and Jellema (2009) provides evidence of a causal 
link from cultural practices to a society’s basic achievements (such as the presence of writing, the wheel 
or money) documented for different cultures in Murdock’s (1967) Ethnographic Atlas.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model. In section 3, we 
discuss the data used in our empirical analysis. In section 4, we present our empirical analysis of how 
culture can affect economic development. Section 5 contains a series of robustness checks. Sections 6 
through 8 examine the interplay between culture, institutions and other factors. In Section 9, we 
investigate occupational choices of various ethnic groups in the USA. Section 10 makes concluding 
remarks.  
2.  The Model 
Consider an economy producing two goods: a final good Yt and a continuum of intermediate goods 
   ,     0,1 . The final good is produced by a competitive sector. Firms in this sector maximize profit  
Π                 
 
              (1) 
subject to the production function constraint:  
          
                 
 
     (2) 
where i and t index variety and time, pit is the price of xit, wt is the wage rate, F it is the quality of 
intermediate good xit ,             
 
    is aggregate labor input, and  is an efficiency parameter measuring 
how easy it is to combine intermediate inputs.  
The parameter  is assumed to be a decreasing function of individualism in a given culture, i.e., 
                     with     0 . This assumption captures three basic facts. First, combining inputs in 
production requires coordination of workers/units.  Second, such coordination is easier to achieve in 
collectivist cultures that value harmony, conformity and team effort. Third, collectivist countries may be 
good at incremental innovations, which however have diminishing returns (i.e., one can relatively easily 
improve a cassette player in terms of design and functionality but one needs a radical innovation to create 
a CD player).    
The common finding that blind copying of production techniques from collectivist culture to 
individualistic cultures led to poor results is consistent with this assumption. For example, Liker (2003) 
shows that teamwork and consensus building are among defining features of the Japanese way to run 
business. The attempts to copy the Japanese organization inside US automobile factories however failed 
to lead to catch up with the efficiency of Japanese automobile firms since American carmakers could 
replicate lean production but could not imitate Toyota’s culture.  6 
 
Other facts are consistent with our modeling of the trade-off between the innovation advantages 
of individualism and the production advantages of collectivism. The color TV was invented by RCA, an 
American firm, but Japan ended up making the best TV sets. Sony invented the walkman which was a 
great consumer success starting in the 1980s. However, the key invention of the compact cassette was 
made by Philips, a European firm. Similarly, Sony introduced the VCR but the technology was invented 
by the American company Ampex, which was unable to make its VCR affordable to households. 
Intermediate goods are produced by entrepreneurial households who solve the following 
optimization problem 
    ∑     
     ln          /      (3) 
subject to 
         1       ,    (4) 
             1       ,     Π      1                (5) 
                     (6) 
where              
 
   is the average level of quality of intermediate goods in the economy, Ait is the 
amount of wealth,     is the fraction of labor supply devoted to producing the final goods, 1     is the 
fraction of labor supply devoted to research, and     is the profit from market power in producing an 
intermediate good. Total labor supply and the marginal cost of producing the intermediate variety are 
normalized to one for all households.   
  Equation (5) is the standard budget constraint. Equation (6) is the profit from producing an 
intermediate variety.  Equation (3) is the value function showing that instantaneous utility is derived from 
consumption goods and from producing a superior than average quality of the intermediate good. The 
choice of the log utility function for consumption is standard in growth models. It makes the analysis 
easier as income and substitution effects offset each other and hence it is easy to construct a balanced 
growth path consistent with the Kaldor facts.  
The term     /    in the utility function is meant to capture the social status reward from 
innovation. We assume that   is increasing in the level of individualism, i.e.,                      with 
    0 . Hence, the social status reward for developing a better technology is higher in individualist 
cultures than in collectivist cultures.  This assumption is consistent with numerous studies documenting 
that individualistic societies permit more innovation than collectivist societies by providing a higher 
status for individuals making important discoveries. In contrast, collectivist societies emphasize the role 
of collective effort and give less status reward to innovation. They reward conformity more and 
discourage individuals from standing out. There is also ample evidence (see Merton 1973) that social 
reward with heightened status is the most significant part of the total reward for scientists. Since 7 
 
individual innovating entrepreneurs are small relative to the number of other entrepreneurs in the 
economy, we assume that an entrepreneur i takes Ft as given when deciding how much labor to allocate to 
research.  
Equation (4) is the law of motion for the quality of the intermediate good. Quality is a positive 
function of the labor supply devoted to research. We assume a deterministic law of motion for simplicity 
only. We also assume that   ·  is an increasing function of the labor supply devoted to research. To 
simplify the algebra, we assume that the elasticity     1         1       /  1        is constant in 
1     .  
  The government taxes profits of intermediate producers at rate  and spends the receipts on 
(wasteful) consumption G which does not provide any utility to households.
3  
            
 
   (7) 
Note that profit     is the only source of rents in this economy. The tax  can also be interpreted as the 
level of expropriation risk, predatory behavior, lack of rule of law and institutional weakness more 
generally. We will henceforth interpret high levels of τ as predatory institutions expropriating rents 
generated by innovations. 
  The following equations are market-clearing conditions: equilibrium between aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply (8), equilibrium on the consumer goods market (9) and labor market equilibrium 
(10): 
                (8) 
            
 
     (9) 
            
 
     (10) 
Profit maximization in the final good sector implies that  
   
   
   1      
                
 
          1      /         0  (11) 
   
    
        
      
    
           0  (12) 
Given the demand for the intermediate goods (12), the entrepreneurial households’ optimality 
conditions are 
   
           (13) 
         1         ,      (14) 
      1        ,              (15) 
          
         1         
      
      
       ,     1     ,        (16) 
     
      
    
     1  (17) 
                                                            
3 Our key qualitative results do not change if we allow government spending to be in the form of lump-sum transfers 
to households or to be an investment in public goods (e.g., infrastructure) which could raise η. Likewise, our key 
qualitative results do not change when we also allow status to be derived from the relative level of consumption. 8 
 
Equation (13) is the standard relationship between consumption Cit and the marginal utility of wealth qit. 
Equation (14) is the Euler equation for consumption. Equation (15) captures the instantaneous optimality 
condition for the allocation of labor to research and production activities. The return on labor has to be 
equalized between research and the final goods sector. Equation (16) is the Euler equation for the quality 
Fit, where     is the shadow value of Fit.  The value of a marginal increase in quality (the right hand side 
of equation on (16)) has three components. The first is the social status derived from developing a better 
technology (the first term on the left hand side). The second is the after-tax marginal revenue product 
from selling xit units of the intermediate good of higher quality, and hence facing a larger demand from 
the final good sector. The third term captures the dynamic gains from better technology. By increasing the 
level of technology today an entrepreneur prepares the stage for future increases in the level of technology 
(see equation (4)). Equation (17) is the first order condition for the level of produced intermediate inputs. 
It states that the marginal revenue product from producing an additional unit of an intermediate input has 
to be equal to the marginal cost of producing this additional unit (recall that the marginal cost is 
normalized to one).  
  We can then derive the following result in the symmetric equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 1: On a balanced growth path, the ratio of labor devoted to research 1    to labor devoted 
to producing final goods   is given by: 
   
       
       
            
 
   
           
        (18) 
The ratio 
   
   is increasing in  , decreasing in  , and is independent of η. 
Proof: See appendix A. 
 
Proposition 1 indicates that the share of labor devoted to research is increasing in the level of 
individualism (larger  ) and decreasing in the strength of predatory institutions (larger τ).  Intuitively, a 
higher social status reward to innovation (larger  ) increases the allocation of labor to innovation.  This 
culturally embedded incentive to innovate comes on top of the monetary reward to households via higher 
profits from innovation.  
The fact that a high level of predatory institutions (larger τ) has a negative effect on innovation is 
less novel. Note that the latter effect is due to the fact that taxes are levied directly on the profit from 
intermediate goods so that τ directly affects the incentive to innovate. If taxation were on final output, its 
distortionary effect on innovation would be absent and would affect only levels of variables.
4  
                                                            
4 Note that profits in the final goods sector are equal to zero in equilibrium and cannot be a source of taxation. If 
labor income were taxed instead, there would be a positive effect of τ on innovation. 9 
 
Note also that the cost of individualism captured by a low value of η only affects the level of 
output for any given average quality of intermediate input, but not the rate of innovation. Indeed, 
parameter η is not present in equation (18). The intuition is that a higher level of η will lead to the same 
proportional increase in the equilibrium level of intermediate output and equilibrium level of final output. 
Since returns to labor in the research and final good sector are equalized, changes in η do not affect the 
equilibrium level of allocation of labor between research and the final good sector.  
The proposition also states that the negative effect of taxes on research effort becomes smaller 
when the status derived from research effort increases. In other words, high status rewards can counteract 
high tax rates because while income and wealth can be expropriated, social status cannot.
5 Thus even if a 
country has bad institutions, there can still be incentives to innovate if there is a high enough status 
reward to innovation. Clark (2007) argues against the view that institutions are important for long-run 
growth by pointing to the fact that institutions in England around the time of the Industrial Revolution 
were no better than in many developing countries today, whose institutional weaknesses are precisely 
cited as the main cause of their underdevelopment. Our model shows that the negative effect of predatory 
institutions on long-run growth can be offset by the social status reward to innovation under an 
individualist culture. Note also that lim   
   
    
 
   
          
       and thus, if   0 , no labor is devoted 
to research when institutions are fully predatory. In other words, if culture were absent in this model, 
predatory institutions would result in lack of innovation. With zero research effort, the growth rate in the 
economy is also equal to zero.    
We now turn to the properties of the economy on the balanced growth path. First, from equation 
(4) on a balanced growth path we get that     
  
    
     1      and consequently sgn 
   
     
sgn 
      / 
     and sgn 
   
      s g n 
      / 
    . Also observe that the level of total factor productivity 
(TPF) in the final goods sector is            
  which varies over time only due to changes in    as we 
assume fixed cultural attributes. The results of Proposition 1 thus carry over to the growth rate of TFP, 
which will be higher for more individualist cultures and for lower levels of taxation.  
Along a balanced path in a symmetrical equilibrium,               
   
  . Using equation (17), we 
get            so that                /         
 /      and therefore     
   
     
    
 /      . We conclude 
that the growth rate of output in the economy is determined by the growth rate of technology, which is 
pinned down by rewards to innovation. From equation (11), we have     
  
    
    . Given that 
                                                            
5 One can argue that predatory institutions and individualist culture should not coexist easily and that under an 
individualist culture, there will eventually be strong pressures to reform political institutions so as to limit the 
executive powers of government. This would point towards a causal effect from culture to institutions. This 
observation is discussed in the empirical section. See also Roland (2004). 10 
 
           and equations (6), (7), and (8), we have                 1     1       . Therefore,     
  
    
     and income, consumption and wages grow at the same rate. From  (14) and (13), we have  
     
    
  
 /    1     /    1 and thus the interest rate is constant. Finally, note that the value of capital, 
which is equal to the present value of profits generated in the intermediate goods sector, is proportional to 
output and hence the capital-output ratio is constant on the balanced growth path. These last results show 
that the model fits the Kaldor facts about economic growth.  
Our model also sheds light on possible episodes of reversal of fortune. In the Malthusian stage 
when labor is allocated almost exclusively to production of final goods (food, clothes, etc.) and virtually 
no labor is allocated to innovation, collectivist societies, which enjoy a greater level of coordination and 
thus a larger value of η, may be richer than individualistic societies. This prediction is consistent with, for 
example, China being richer, more urbanized and more densely populated than much of Western Europe 
in 1500. However, as the economy exits the Malthusian stage, the collectivism-individualism difference 
across cultures starts to play a new and different role. Since individualistic societies grow faster than 
collectivist societies outside the Malthusian stage, countries with an individualistic culture eventually 
become richer and thus one may observe a “reversal of fortune”, i.e. those countries catch up and become 
more affluent than collectivist countries which initially had a higher level of development.
6  
While there is a trade-off between the benefits and costs of individualism and collectivism, in our 
model the benefits of individualism affect the output growth rate while the costs of individualism affect 
the level of output.
7 Although there is a strong argument for the advantages of individualist culture for 
long-run growth via cultural incentives to innovate, one could think of other models where collectivism 
might affect not only the static output level but also long-run growth. For example, in a collectivist 
culture there might be better public good provision which could be complementary to private innovation, 
a feature that is not present in this model. We need solid empirical evidence to find out which cultural 
features have more favorable effects on long-run growth, and below we present some empirical evidence 
for the importance of the individualism-collectivism dimension of culture. In any case, our model has the 
advantage of i) spelling out precise mechanisms through which culture may affect long-run growth, and 
                                                            
6 We replicated the exercise in Acemoglu et al (2002) with our measure of individualism instead of institutions and 
we find that culture is not robustly correlated with urbanization and population density in 1500. The estimated 
effects of culture do not change even after controlling for initial conditions and the level of institutions (i.e., we 
reproduce Table VIII in Acemoglu et al (2002)). Results are available upon request.  
7 Using information on the behavior of foreign firms operating in China, Huang et al. (2010) compare foreign firms 
owned by ethnic Chinese and firms owned by non-ethnic Chinese. Huang et al. find that firms run by ethnic Chinese 
have an initial advantage operating in China but that they have a dynamic disadvantage because they invest less in 
technology and human capital than firms owned by non-ethnic Chinese. These results are consistent with our model 
if non-ethnic Chinese owned firms are from more individualistic cultures. 11 
 
ii) making the distinction between cultural features  that  affect  the level of output and those that affect 
the long-run rate of growth.
8  
To summarize, the endogenous growth model derived in this section can match the basic Kaldor 
facts on economic growth but predicts importantly that a higher level of individualism in a country’s 
culture should lead to higher long-run growth because of the social status reward attached to innovation, 
an effect that is independent of the monetary reward to innovation.  
3.  Data 
A key question for our empirical analysis is how to measure individualism. A well-known measure of 
individualism (and other cultural dimensions) at the country level was developed by Hofstede (2001) who 
used surveys of IBM employees in about 30 countries. To avoid cultural biases in the way questions are 
framed, the translation of the survey into local languages was done by a team of English and local 
language speakers. With new waves of surveys and replication studies, Hofstede’s measure of 
individualism has been expanded to almost 80 countries.
9 In a nutshell, the individualism score measures 
the extent to which it is believed that individuals are supposed to take care of themselves as opposed to 
being strongly integrated and loyal to a cohesive group. Individuals in countries with a high level of the 
index value personal freedom and status, while individuals in countries with a low level of the index value 
harmony and conformity. Hofstede’s index as well as the measures of individualism from other studies 
use a broad array of survey questions to establish cultural values. Factor analysis is used to summarize 
data and construct indices. In Hofstede’s analysis, the index of individualism is the first factor in work 
goal questions about the value of personal time, freedom, interesting and fulfilling work, etc. This 
component loads positively on valuing individual freedom, opportunity, achievement, advancement, 
recognition and negatively on valuing harmony, cooperation, relations with superiors.
10 Although 
Hofstede’s data were initially collected mostly with the purpose of understanding differences in IBM’s 
corporate culture, the main advantage of Hofstede’s measure of individualism is that it has been validated 
in a number of studies.
11 For example, across various studies and measures of individualism (see Hofstede 
                                                            
8 Much of previous research on culture’s effects on economic outcomes (e.g., Knack and Keefer (1997) and Guiso et 
al. (2009)) focused on trust, social capital and similar concepts that emphasize collective effort. In contrast, we stress 
the individual’s freedom from the collective in his or her aspirations. Our finding that individualism leads to higher 
development does not contradict previous results on the importance of trust, social capital, etc. for economic 
development. One can view our results as emphasizing growth effects, while previous studies as highlighting the 
level effects.   
9 The most current version of the data is available at http://www.geert-hofstede.com/.  
10 Appendix C provides the list of questions. See Hofstede (2001) for more details. 
11 See for example Hoppe’s (1990) study among members of parliaments, labor and employer leaders, academics 
and artists in 18 countries, Shane’s (1995) study across 28 countries for international companies other than IBM, 
Merrit’s (2000) study on commercial airline pilots in 19 countries, de Mooij’s (2003) survey among consumers in 15 
European countries and van Nimwegen’s (2002) research among  employees of ABN-AMRO bank in 19 countries. 12 
 
(2001) for a review) the United Kingdom, the USA and Netherlands are consistently among the most 
individualistic countries, while Pakistan, Nigeria and Peru are among the most collectivist.  Figure 1 
represents a world map of Hofstede's individualism scores.  
We also use the data base established by cross-cultural psychologist Shalom Schwartz, built with 
the purpose of establishing a core set of values that have a common cross-cultural meaning. Schwartz 
(1994) gathered survey responses from K-12 schoolteachers and college students for a total of 195 
samples drawn from 78 nations and 70 cultural groups between 1998 and 2000.  Each sample generally 
consists of 180-280 respondents for a total of over 75,000 responses. Schwartz’s value survey consists of 
56-57 value items that ask respondents to indicate the importance of each as “a guiding principle in my 
life.” Schwartz believes that it is crucial to identify what he calls value types which reflect the type of 
motivational goals that each individual expresses. As such, he identifies a list of 10 such value types. 
These value types are intended to be items that have an equivalent meaning across cultures. These value 
types have been used to create cultural mappings. In particular, similarly to the individualistic-collectivist 
dimension of cultures in Hosftede (2001), Schwartz differentiates cultures along the autonomy and 
embeddedness dimensions. In autonomous cultures, people are viewed as autonomous, bounded entities. 
They are encouraged to cultivate and express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and to 
find meaning in their own uniqueness by pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions 
independently (intellectual autonomy) and by pursuing positive experiences for themselves (affective 
autonomy). In contrast, meaning in life for people in embedded cultures comes largely through social 
relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared way of life, and striving 
toward its shared goals. Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining actions 
that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. Countries that score high on embeddedness 
also score low on intellectual and affective autonomy. Although measures of individualism in Hofstede 
and Schwartz are based on different sources and indentifying procedures, the correlation between   
Hofstede’s individualism score and Schwartz’s embeddedness and autonomy scores is fairly high, ranging 
between 0.55 and 0.65.  The key advantage of using Hofstede’s measure relative to Schwartz’s measures 
is that Hofstede’s measure of individualism is one-dimensional while Schwartz uses three (correlated) 
variables.  
As we will discuss later in greater detail, the causality between individualism and economic 
outcomes can flow in both directions. For example, our model suggests a causal effect of culture on 
growth where more individualist countries may be wealthier because individualism fosters innovation. On 
the other hand, a more affluent economy can support a more individualist culture. Indeed, there is a long 
tradition in social sciences starting with Marx claiming that economic development affects a country’s 
culture. 13 
 
To address this potential endogeneity problem, we use a measure of genetic distance between 
people in different countries as an instrumental variable (IV) for individualism. To the extent that culture 
is transmitted mainly from parents to children, so are genes. Thus, genetic markers can be used as a proxy 
for cultural markers and this instrumental variable should be seen as a proxy measure of cultural 
transmission.  
The genetic data originate from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) which provides measured genetic 
markers for roughly 2,000 groups of population across the globe. These data contain allele frequencies 
(alleles are variants taken by a gene) for various ethnic groups. Since we want to eliminate the feedback 
from economic outcomes to genetic variation, we focus on neutral genetic markers which are not related 
to evolutionary fitness. Furthermore, as discussed in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), genetic variation for 
countries not affected by massive colonization since 1500s was largely determined during the Neolithic 
migration of early humans thousands of years ago. These markers are thus potentially excellent 
instrumental variables.
12   
Although there are many genetic markers potentially useful for our analysis, our instrument is the 
Euclidian (benchmark) or Mahalanobis distance between the frequency of blood types in a given country 
and the frequency of blood types in the USA, which is the most individualistic country in our sample.
13 
The Euclidian distance measure is displayed in Figure 2.
14 Using the frequency of blood types is attractive 
because, apart from being neutral genetic markers, the frequency of alleles determining blood types is the 
most widely available genetic information and thus we can construct the most comprehensive (in terms of 
country coverage) measure of genetic distance.
15 Another key advantage of utilizing frequency of blood 
types is that we can exploit alternative sources of information (e.g., Red Cross) about frequency of blood 
types to corroborate our data from DNA studies.
16 In a series of robustness checks, we also employ 
                                                            
12 Note that the genetic and cultural data  were collected predominantly in 1950s through the early 1970s.  On the 
other hand, our measures of economic outcomes are generally from the 21
st century. This difference in the timing of 
explanatory/instrumental variables (i.e., culture and genetic variables) and dependent variables (i.e., economic 
outcomes) helps us to alleviate certain types of endogeneity (e.g., recent strong migration of skilled workers).  
13 The Mahalanobis distance between a vector x and y picked from distributions X is     ,            ′Σ 
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14 Appendix E shows the geographical distribution of genetic distance relative to the UK. The advantage of using 
distance relative to the UK is that UK’s population is genetically more homogenous and that UK is often described 
as the cradle of individualism and the Industrial revolution.  
15 In contrast, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) use genetic information for 42 ethnic groups while we use the full 
spectrum of genetic information for 2,000 groups.  We complement genetic information from Cavalli-Sforza et al. 
(1994) with Mourant et al. (1976) and Tills et al. (1983).  
16 In some cases, we have information on the distribution of phenotypes of blood groups. In these cases, we convert 
phenotypes into genotypes using the Bernstein formula.  14 
 
aggregate measures of genetic distance constructed in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) and used in Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2009).  
Since the genetic data are available at the level of ethnic groups while our analysis is done at the 
country level, we have aggregated genetic information using ethnic shares of population from Fearon 
(2003).
17 Specifically, if we define blood frequency fbec for blood type b and ethnic group e in country c, 
then the country level blood frequency for type b is calculated as         ∑             where sec is the share 
of ethnic group e in the population of country c.   
We also use other genetic and epidemiological  data for which the recent literature in cross-
cultural psychology has found a direct link between frequencies of particular genes and culture. A first set 
of data are from Chiao and Blizinsky (2009) who document a strong correlation between collectivism and 
the presence of a short (S) allele in the polymorphism 5-HTTLPR of the serotonin transporter gene 
SLC6A4 in 30 countries. This allele is known in psychology to put individuals at greater risk for 
depression when exposed to life stressors. The mechanism linking individual behavior and culture is that 
a collectivist culture protects individuals from these risks by embedding them more strongly in 
communities with strong social links thus providing strong psychological support networks. We also use 
data on 23 countries from Way and Liebermann (2010) showing that collectivism is also strongly 
correlated with the G allele in polymorphism A118G in the -opoid receptor gene that leads to higher 
stress in case of social rejection. Way and Liebermann (2010) reason that collectivist culture can be seen 
as providing psychological protection from social rejection.
18 Finally, we use epidemiological data put 
together by Fincher et al. (2008) for 73 countries on pathogen prevalence.
19 Given a strong correlation 
between pathogen prevalence and collectivism, Finch et al. argue that stronger pathogen prevalence 
pushed communities to adopt more collectivist values emphasizing tradition, putting stronger limits on 
individual behavior, and showing less openness towards foreigners. Collectivism is thus understood as a 
defense mechanism created to cope with greater pathogen prevalence. 
In addition to DNA-based IVs, we also employ an instrumental variable based on linguistic 
peculiarities of individualistic cultures. Specifically, in languages where the pronoun cannot be dropped 
in a sentence there is a greater differentiation between the individual (first person of the singular) and the 
community, whereas in languages where pronouns can be dropped there is less emphasis on such a 
differentiation. Kashima and Kashima (1998) and others document that prohibition of pronoun drop is 
                                                            
17 Whenever Fearon’s (2003) data were too crude, we used additional sources of information. For example, Fearon 
(2003) reports on the share of whites in the USA. We used a variety of sources about migration patterns and 
information on ancestors to split whites into British, German, Italian, Polish, etc. Details are available upon request.  
18 We are very grateful to Romain Wacziarg for having drawn our attention to this study and to this literature. 
19 Fincher et al. (2008) use 9 pathogens: leishmanias, trypanosomes, malaria, schistosomes, filariae, leprosy, dengue, 
typhus and tuberculosis. 15 
 
strongly correlated with individualism.
20 This instrumental variable was used in Licht et al. (2007), 
Tabellini (2008a) and other papers studying the effects of culture on socioeconomic outcomes.  
The sources of data on economic outcomes are standard. We take income per worker data from 
the Penn World Tables (version 6.3). To control for differences in factor endowments, we use data on 
total factor productivity (TFP) from Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2010). These two 
measures have been widely used as measures of long-run growth in the literature.  
Since the main conduit of individualism’s effect on growth in our theoretical model is innovation, 
we proxy for the intensity of innovations with the innovation performance index and the log patents per 
million population from Economist Intelligence Unit (2007, 2009; henceforth EIU). EIU constructs 
patents per million population  as the sum of patents granted to applicants (by residence) from the 82 
economies by three major government patent offices—the European Patent Office, the Japanese Patent 
Office, and the US Patent and Trademark Office. The data are averaged over 2002-2007. Although the 
use of patent data has a number of problems, this is the single best available measure for innovation 
outputs.  The innovation performance index incorporates information on patents and alternative indicators 
of innovation output such as royalty and license fee receipts as a percentage of GDP, high-technology 
manufacturing output per head, high-technology services output per head, etc. As documented in EIU 
(2007, 2009), these measures are highly correlated with other proxies for innovation performance such as 
citations from scientific and technical journals, UNIDO estimates of the share of medium- and high-
technology products in a country’s manufacturing output and its manufacturing exports, and the results of 
a survey question from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report that asked 
respondents to rate the extent to which companies were adept at, or able to absorb, new technology. Thus, 
these measures of innovation are likely to capture salient features of innovative activities across countries.  
4.  Baseline econometric specification and results 
Our theoretical model predicts that more individualistic countries should be more affluent since 
individualism encourages innovation.  Consistent with this prediction, Figure 3 shows that countries with 
more individualistic cultures enjoy higher levels of income, TFP and rates of innovation. Also, innovation 
is strongly positively correlated with income and TFP (Figure 4). These raw correlations, some of which 
were reported earlier in Hofstede (2001), are informative but they do not control for other factors and 
cannot be interpreted as causal relationships.
21  
To address these concerns, we employ the following basic econometric specification: 
                                                            
20 For example, English does not allow dropping pronouns and it is the only language which capitalizes “I”.  
21 Note that Southeast Asian tiger economies have high innovation rates and a relatively low index of individualism. 
This might be explained by the fact that research effort in these countries was mostly directed and financed by the 
government rather than arising spontaneously.  16 
 
                      (19) 
where  i indexes countries, Yi measures an economic outcome (e.g., log income per worker), Ci  is a 
measure of culture, Xi is a vector of control variables and ei is the error term.
22  The vector Xi includes 
commonly used controls for geography such as countries’ longitude and latitude and a dummy variable 
for being landlocked. In addition to this standard set of controls, we include the percentage of Muslims in 
a given country to ensure that our results are not driven by a Muslim effect. Finally, Xi includes a set of 
dummy variables for continents.  
As discussed above, genetic distance is our main instrumental variable to deal with reverse 
causality in equation (19). Figure 5 shows that countries with more individualistic cultures are genetically 
less distant from the US. The converse applies to countries with collectivist cultures. At the same time, 
countries with individualist and collectivist cultures are genetically distant from each other. The strong 
negative correlation between genetic distance (computed relative to USA, which has a highly 
individualistic culture) and individualism suggest that genetic distance may be a strong instrument.  
Table 1 (Panel A) presents the OLS and IV estimates for the basic specification (19) where the 
dependent variables is log income per worker. Irrespective of whether we use controls and/or continental 
dummies, the coefficient on individualism is positive and significant. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in individualism (say from the score of Venezuela to Greece, or from that of Brazil to 
Luxemburg) leads to 60 to 87 percent increase in the level of income, which is a large effect. The 
magnitude of the effect is roughly similar regardless of whether we introduce continental dummies and 
control variables. The IV estimates are slightly larger than the OLS estimates which probably suggests 
that the instrumental variable corrects for measurement errors and thus for the attenuation bias. Note that 
the first stage fit is strong in all columns and thus our results are not likely to suffer from problems 
associated with using weak IVs. Overall, these empirical results confirm the insights from our theoretical 
model and strongly suggest that the advantages of individualism outweigh its disadvantages relative to 
collectivism, and thus that individualism has a positive causal effect on the wealth of nations.
23  
From Hall and Jones (1999) and others, we know that the main factor behind differences in 
incomes is differences in the level of TFP across countries. In Table 1 (Panels B and C), we replicate our 
estimation of equation (19) when log TFP rather than log income per worker is the dependent variable. 
Again, we find strong and positive effects of individualism on productivity. A one standard deviation 
increase in the individualism score leads to a 17 to 27 percent increase in TFP.  Note that the effect on 
                                                            
22 In light of the critique of regressions based on growth rates (see e.g. Easterly et al (1993), Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999)), we focus on levels of income and other economic variables. In Appendix 
Table 2, we report results for growth rates over long periods of time based on data constructed in Maddison (2003). 
23 Although we use GDP per worker in 2000 in our baseline regressions, the results are very similar when we use the 
level of income from other decades.  17 
 
TFP is smaller than the effect on income. This should be expected since differences in income per worker 
are due to differences in factor accumulation on top of differences in TFP.  
Finally, we perform a more direct test of our theory by regressing measures of innovation on 
individualism (Table 1, Panels D and E). With and without controls, we see a strong robust effect of 
individualism, confirming the channel going from individualism to innovation and to income and 
productivity.  Importantly, this finding highlights that although countries may achieve a larger level of 
total factor productivity via diffusion of existing knowledge and willingness of people in individualistic 
cultures to accept new goods/services as well as new ways of producing goods/services, individualism 
affects the creation of knowledge. In other words, individualism not only helps countries to approach to 
the technological frontier, it also pushes the frontier. 
To assess whether the magnitudes of individualism’s effect on economic outcomes are plausible, 
consider differences in economic outcomes in Italy’s South and North, which is a prime example of the 
importance of cultural effects. In his classic book, Putnam (1994) argues that the North of Italy is 
culturally similar to Switzerland and Germany (the individualism score for these countries is equal to 68) 
while the South of Italy is similar to Spain (the score is 51). Our baseline regression results (column (8) in 
Table 1) predict that the difference in income per capita and TFP between Italy’s North and South should 
be 0.0341758% and 0.0201734% respectively.  According to Italy’s statistical office income per 
capita in Southern regions is about 50% smaller than income per capita in Northern regions. Using the 
methods developed in Hall and Jones (1999), Aiello and Scoppa (2000) estimate the difference in TFP 
across two regions to be 27%. Thus predictions made from our cross-country regression are remarkably 
similar to within-Italy variation in incomes and productivity and validate our parameter estimates.  
One may be concerned that our results are driven by a set of countries which for historical 
reasons were disadvantaged in economic development. Likewise, if our theory explains income 
differences at the global scale, it is reasonable to expect our theory to explain income differences within 
continents where countries may be more similar. These concerns are important because, for example, 
Albouy (2008) argues that the theory of institutions as the fundamental cause of economic development 
has weak or no empirical support when tested within continents. More generally, we are interested in 
whether our results survive when we consider more homogenous countries.  
Table 2 reports regression estimates for each continent separately and for OECD economies. By 
and large, we confirm our basic finding that individualism leads to higher income per worker. Even if we 
focus on OECD countries or relatively more developed countries in Europe and the Americas, 
individualism can explain a large fraction of variation in income. Although the coefficient on 
individualism is somewhat smaller for the subsample of developed countries, it does not necessarily mean 
that culture is less important. It simply reflects the fact that variation in incomes and individualism is 18 
 
more compressed in these countries and thus, with less variation in our key variables, measurement errors 
can have a stronger attenuation bias. This observation can also explain why the estimated coefficients are 
the largest for Africa where countries are extremely diverse in the level of development and 
individualism. For example, Morocco has the highest individualism scores (same level as Argentina), 
excluding South Africa, whereas Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Ghana have the lowest scores (same as China, 
Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam).
24 Most importantly, to eliminate concerns that our results reflect 
migration patterns from the colonization era in which the Americas and Oceania were settled by European 
immigrants, column (5) gives result for Africa, Europe and Asia where there was no massive migration of 
European settlers. Note that the coefficient in the IV estimation is even larger than in the results from 
Table 1 where the Americas and Oceania were included. In summary, our results are not driven by a 
particular continent and the effect of culture is significant also within continents.  We can also rule out 
that our results reflect only migration patterns of European settlers in the colonization period of the last 
500 years. 
To summarize, we have shown empirically a strong causal effect from culture to long-run growth 
and the level of innovation. These findings are consistent with the predictions of our theory indicating that 
more individualist cultures should lead to more innovation and hence greater economic development.  
5.  Robustness checks and direct genetic/epidemiological effects on culture. 
Table 3 reports results for a series of robustness checks. In column (1), instead of using as instrument for 
culture the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a country relative to the USA, we 
use the Mahalanobis distance which takes into account the covariance between variables when calculating 
the distance. In column (2), we use the frequency of blood types A and B separately so that there are two 
instrumental variables instead of one and we do not need to construct a distance measure to a particular 
country. In column (3), we use the Euclidian distance for both blood types but this time relative to the UK 
rather than the USA. In column (4), instead of using the Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) data on blood types, 
we use the data from the Red Cross. Although the Red Cross data are available for a smaller set of 
countries, it does not require us to use ethnic shares in population to aggregate genetic data to the country 
level. In columns (5) and (6), we use the genetic distance data used by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009). 
Their data also come from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) data. In contrast to our blood distance, Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2009) take genetic distances calculated by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) for a larger set of 
genes. However, with a larger set of genes, the distance can be computed for only 42 subgroups of the 
world population. Similar to our approach, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) aggregate ethnic data to the 
                                                            
24 Hofstede’s score for South Africa is based on the sample of whites. None of our results change in any important 
way when we exclude South Africa. 19 
 
country level using shares of ethnic groups in country populations. Column (7) uses the prohibition of 
pronoun drop as an instrument whereas in column (8), it is used as an instrument on top of blood distance.  
We find similar results in these robustness checks aimed at assessing the sensitivity to using alternative 
measures of genetic or linguistic distance between cultures.  
In our analysis so far, we have used the genetic distance as a proxy for cultural transmission. In 
Table 4, we report regressions with genetic and epidemiological instrumental variables from the recent 
cross-cultural psychology literature.  As we discussed in section 3, these alternative instrumental variables 
have a direct effect on individualism/collectivism as the factors captured by these instrumental variables 
are conducive for emergence of collectivist cultures. Column (1) presents results for the instrumental 
variable regression of log output per worker on individualism where the instrument is the frequency of the 
short (S) allele in the polymorphic region 5HTTPLR of the serotonin transporter gene (SLC6A4). Even 
though the data are available only for 30 countries, the first stage fit is remarkably strong and we continue 
to find a strong effect of culture on income. The instrumental variable in column (3) is the frequency of 
the G allele in polymorphism A118G in the -opoid receptor gene (data are from Way and Lieberman 
(2010)) that leads to higher stress in case of social rejection. The results stay significant despite the low 
number of observations (23). Column (5) uses as instrument a measure of historical pathogen prevalence 
from Fincher et al. (2008). We prefer the historical pathogen prevalence index because it uses data from 
old atlases of infectious diseases which were compiled before the epidemiological revolution in treating 
infectious diseases. Again, we find a strong effect of culture on economic development.  
Note that the magnitudes of the effect for all alternative instrumental variables are similar to the 
magnitude we find for the baseline specification which uses blood distance as an instrumental variable. 
Furthermore, when we combine alternative instrumental variables with the blood distance (columns 2, 4, 
and 6 in Table 4), overidentifying restriction tests cannot reject the null of instrumental variables being 
correctly excluded at any standard significance level.  This result not only helps us to justify our exclusion 
restrictions but also clarifies the role of genetic distance in our exercise. Specifically, Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2009) interpret genetic distance as a proxy for barriers to the diffusion of knowledge. In 
contrast, we interpret genetic (blood) distance as a proxy for cultural distance between populations. For 
the former interpretation, we should not expect that genetic and epidemiological instruments with direct 
effect on culture should yield estimates of culture’s effect on economic outcomes similar to estimates 
based on genetic distance as an instrumental variable. On the other hand, for the latter interpretation to be 
correct, this alternative set of instruments should lead to similar estimates. Thus, the overidentifying 
restriction tests fail to reject the null that our interpretation is correct. These results together with our 
benchmark results clearly show a causal link from culture to economic development. 20 
 
Finally, we explore in Table 5 if our basic results are sensitive to alternative measures of 
individualism. Specifically, we re-run specification (19) using Schwartz’s embeddedness and autonomy 
measures as the dependent variables. Again, we find that individualism leads to higher levels of income.  
6.  Culture and institutions 
We now turn to the relationship between culture and institutions in the context of long-run growth. We 
have documented a strong causal effect of culture, along the individualism-collectivism dimension, on log 
income per worker and TFP. Acemoglu et al. (2001) and others on the other hand argue that there is a 
causal effect of institutions on long-run growth.  This raises two interconnected questions. First, does 
culture have an effect separate from the effect of institutions? This question is important because culture 
and institutions are correlated and it is possible that culture simply captures the effect embodied in 
institutions. Second, what is the relative importance of culture and institutions in explaining economic 
development? This question aims to assess the quantitative importance of culture and institutions once 
they are considered simultaneously as factors determining economic development.  
We already saw from the results of Table 2 that there was a robust and strong effect of culture on 
growth if we exclude the Americas and Oceania where there has been very strong migration from 
European settlers. However, it is useful to analyze the effects of culture when we introduce institutions in 
the empirical analysis. We augment the baseline econometric specification (19) with the average 
protection against expropriation risk between 1985 and 2009, a measure of institutions used by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001):
25 
                            (20) 
where Ii is a measure of institutions in country i. Estimates of equation (20) (see Table 6) show that 
culture (individualism) remains significant even after including institutions in the OLS and IV 
specifications. Culture thus has a robust effect that is separate from institutions. Furthermore, even after 
controlling for protection against expropriation risk, the causal effect of individualism is large. A one 
standard deviation increase in the individualism score leads to a 47 to 73 percent increase in the level of 
income without instrument for institutions and  to a 56 to 77 percent increase in the level of income when 
the institutional variable is instrumented using the settler mortality variable as in Acemoglu et al. 
(2001).
26  
Note that the size of the effect of culture on income remains fairly robust to including institutions 
and other controls. We cannot say the same for the institutional variable which is rather sensitive to 
including controls and individualism in the regression. For example, with no controls and without culture 
                                                            
25 Acemoglu et al. (2001) use the average of the same data between 1985 and 1999. 
26 We find similar results when we use long-run growth rates. See Appendix Table 2.  21 
 
(column (2) in Panel A of Table 6), a one standard deviation increase in protection against expropriation 
risk raises the level of income by 84 percent as can be seen in the OLS specification in panel A of Table 
6. Once we introduce controls and individualism (column (5) in Panel A of Table 6), the effect is reduced 
by nearly one half. Note also that the coefficient on institutions does not increase in the IV estimation 
(panel B) once culture is included but rather tends to decrease, which was not the case in Acemoglu et al. 
(2001). Note also that the effect of institutions ceases to be statistically significantly different from zero 
when we apply the correction for settler mortality as in Albouy (2008) and include culture in the 
regression (columns 8 and 9 in panel B). We observe similar results (not reported) when we use 
innovation or TFP (rather than income per worker) as the dependent variable.
27,28  
  In brief, there is an important contribution of culture to economic development that is 
independent of institutions. In terms of magnitudes, culture explains income differences across countries 
at least as much as institutions. 
7.  Genetic distance and other channels for growth 
Genetic distance may be correlated with variables other than culture which might affect development. 
Although this is not a concern for our results in Table 4 where we use genetic and epidemiological 
variables with a direct effect on culture as instrumental variables,  it is important to rule out the influence 
of other potentially important determinants of long-run growth for our baseline approach of using genetic 
distance as an instrumental variable.  Table 7 reports estimates of the effect of culture on our outcome 
variables when we control for a variety of additional factors.  
For example, genetic distance may reflect geographical distance which has nothing to do with 
culture but relates to transport costs in international trade (see e.g. Giuliano et al. 2006). To address this 
concern, we introduce the log of the population-weighted distance of a country from the UK, which 
proxies for transportation costs from the cradle of the Industrial revolution.  While this distance variable 
is negatively correlated with the log of income per worker, when it is combined with the individualism 
score, it is not statistically significant while our cultural variable remains robustly significant both in the 
OLS and IV specifications.  
Genetic distance might also be related to other cultural variables. A variable that has been widely 
used in the social sciences literature is the measure of generalized trust constructed from the World 
                                                            
27 Importantly, genetic distance is not significantly correlated with institutions and therefore our instrumental 
variable does not pick up variation of individualism correlated with institutions.  
28 We also looked at another popular measure of institutions, the legal origins variable put forward by La Porta et al. 
(1998) and in the literature that followed. In regressions similar to those reported in Tables 6 and 7, there are two 
striking findings. First, individualism remains robustly significant. Second, none of the legal origin variables are 
robustly significant which is consistent with the results in Jellema and Roland (2009) reporting that legal 
institutional variables did not play an important role in explaining growth. 22 
 
Values Survey. It is often interpreted either as a cultural norm that reduces transaction costs or as a 
measure of social capital which reflects the density of social networks and a culture of participation and 
citizenship. While there is some correlation between log income per worker and trust, it is not robust. 
Once we regress log income per worker on both individualism and trust, trust ceases to be significant 
while individualism remains robustly significant and quantitatively important.
29  
Finally, we control for other potentially important factors: average protection against property 
rights, legal origins, ethnic fractionalization and human capital.
30  While institutions and the education 
index are strongly correlated with log of income per worker and the log of patents per capita, 
individualism remains strongly significant in all specifications. Also observe that since we do not 
instrument potentially endogenous controls such as trust, legal origins, education, etc., we likely bias the 
estimate of culture’s effect downward and therefore the true effect of culture can be larger.
31 In other 
specifications (not reported), we also examined including other controls as indicators of the rule of law 
and indicators of democracy and the results are similar. 
In summary, although genetic distance may be correlated with non-cultural factors or cultural 
factors other than individualism, none of the popular alternatives appears to change our main result that 
individualism plays an important role in determining economic development. These results together with 
the more direct instrumental variables used in Table 4 unambiguously show that culture cannot be ignored 
as an important determinant of long run growth. 
8.  Causal channels between culture and institutions. 
The last question we try to address is whether culture causally affects institutions or vice versa. 
Arguments could go both ways. One can reason that culture shapes institutions. When institutions are put 
in place, they correspond to a view of how the world works and are thus based on culture. The political 
transformations that took place in the Western world between the eighteenth and twentieth century from 
absolute monarchy and autocracy to republican and democratic regimes can be seen as based on the 
values of the Enlightenment that go back to the Renaissance period and the rediscovery and 
                                                            
29 Although the raw correlation between trust and genetic distance is significant, this correlation disappears after 
controlling for basic factors such as longitude/latitude, landlocked dummy, etc.  
30 Human capital is proxied with the 2000 education index from the United Nations. This index is measured by the 
adult literacy rate (with a weight of two thirds) and the combined primary, secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment 
ratio (with a weight of one third). We obtain very similar results if we use the Barro-Lee measures of educational 
attainment.  
31 One may argue that many of these variables should themselves be instrumented. Note however that we are facing 
potential difficulties when doing this. First of all, it may be very hard to find a good instrument for all relevant 
variables. Second, even if this were possible, the data sets for which all instruments would overlap would be 
considerably smaller. Already when using our genetic instrument together with settler mortality, our number of 
observations drops from 76 to 35. By not instrumenting an explanatory variable in the growth regression, we are 
biasing downward our estimate of the effect of the cultural variable which we instrument (see Appendix B for more 
details). Therefore, if we find a significant positive effect of culture on growth, the true effect is likely to be larger.  23 
 
reappropriation of the Greek culture of rationality and democracy. The French revolution led to the 
abolition of monarchy and profound institutional changes that were inspired by the ideals of the 
Enlightenment. In contrast, large-scale revolts in China throughout its history led at best to the 
replacement of one emperor/dynasty by another one (Finer, 1997). This is because the Chinese imperial 
system was in line with the Confucianist culture and its view of the “good emperor” as father figure with 
the associated moral duties towards the people. Within that culture, dissatisfaction of the people tended to 
be interpreted as the result of having a “bad” emperor and replacing him with a “good” emperor who 
would behave according to the Confucianist moral cannons was seen as the appropriate response. Culture 
can thus be argued to affect institutional choices of a society.  
However, one can also make a case in favor of an opposite causal channel. People lived for 
centuries under empires characterized by different institutional organizations, be it the Chinese imperial 
system, the Ottoman Empire or the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The administrative apparatus of empires 
(as well as of smaller political entities) made it possible to influence the world view of people living 
within its boundaries, usually by the spreading of religions such as Islam under the Ottoman Empire or 
Catholicism under the Austro-Hungarian Empire.
32 For example, Confucianism became widespread in 
China in part because it was adopted as the official ideology of the empire as early as the Han dynasty. 
Institutions can thus be argued to have affected the spread of specific culture, and thus also the degree of 
individualism and collectivism.  
We thus test for the existence of two causal channels: from culture to institutions and from 
institutions to culture. For this test we employ two econometric specifications: 
                          (21) 
                          (22) 
where I is a measure of institutions (i.e., protection against expropriation risk as in Acemoglu et al. 
(2001)), C is a measure of culture (i.e., individualism), X is a vector of controls, and e and u are error 
terms. In equation (21), individualism is instrumented with the blood distance we constructed before. In 
equation (22), protection against expropriation risk is instrumented with settler mortality.  If we find that 
     is significant while      is not, culture can be interpreted as causing institutions. If      is 
significant while      is not, institutions can be interpreted as causing culture. Joint significance of      
and      can be understood as causation flowing in both ways.  
The results for equation (21) are reported in Panel A of Table 8. The effect of individualism on 
the strength of economic institutions is positive and significant thus implying a flow of causality from 
culture to institutions. This finding corroborates Tabellini (2008a) and Licht et al. (2007). We report 
                                                            
32 Grosjean (2009) finds that having lived together under the same empire for more than 100 years reduced a 
measure of cultural distance between two localities by at least a third. 24 
 
results for equation (22) in Panel B (which uses settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001)) and Panel 
C (which uses settler mortality from Albouy (2008)) of Table 8. Results in Panel B indicate that causality 
also flows from institutions to culture. However, according to results in panel C, the effect of institutions 
on culture ceases to be significant once one introduces controls. Also note that the first stage fit in Panel C 
becomes quite poor so that the standard statistical inference probably overstates the significance of the 
estimated coefficients as weak instruments typically mean much wider confidence intervals.  Hence, the 
effect of institutions on culture might be less robust than the other way round. One must however be 
careful in interpreting all these results since they are based only on 35 observations, the countries for 
which the data on culture and institutions and their instruments overlap.  In summary, culture has a causal 
effect on institutions and is itself influenced by institutions, although the latter direction of causation is 
less clear cut than the former. 
9.  Within-country evidence  
Cross-country analysis may fail to control fully for differences in institutional factors. However, we can 
examine the effect of culture within a given country, thereby holding institutional factors constant. 
Specifically, our model predicts that more individualistic cultures should ceteris paribus stimulate 
persons to choose research-oriented occupations that require independent thought and deviation from 
traditional ways of doing things. For this analysis, the U.S.A. is a particularly attractive research object 
since this country has many ethnicities and occupational opportunities are relatively open for peoples of 
all origins and cultures.
33  
We use ethnicity, age, gender, birth place, educational attainment from the 5 percent public micro 
data (IPUMS) of the U.S. Census in year 2000. Our sample includes only employed males who are aged 
between 25 and 60 and have non-missing information on ancestors (country of origin). The reason why 
we constrain the sample only to individuals with non-missing ethnicity information is because then we 
focus only on individuals who associate themselves with a particular culture (which could be different 
from the American one) and are likely to observe the traditions of their original cultures. We exclude 
females, unemployed and other ages to minimize the various possible selection effects.  
We consider several sub-samples. The first sample split is determined by whether an individual is 
born in the U.S.A. so that we can attenuate the effects of high-human-capital migration into the USA 
(intuitively, high-human-capital migration from countries with low level of individualism could create a 
sample of highly individualistic U.S. persons from these countries, and thus the difference between 
persons from individualistic cultures/countries and collectivist cultures/countries would not be reflected in 
                                                            
33 In this respect, our analysis is similar to Fisman and Miguel (2007) who study how norms determine corrupt 
behavior when institutions are the same. 25 
 
the sample). The second sample split is based on educational attainment. By focusing on individuals with 
a bachelor (or higher) degree we can attenuate the effects of differences in initial conditions across 
ethnicities and also differences in abilities. The higher is the level of educational attainment, the smaller 
should be the effect of differences in initial conditions and abilities on the estimates.  
Our approach has two steps. In the first step, we estimate the following probit: 
      Φ        Σ         e r r o r      (23) 
where i, s, k index individuals, categories of educational attainment, ROO is a dummy variable equal to 
one if an individual has a research oriented occupation and zero otherwise, D is a set of dummies of each 
ethnicity, and the vector X includes controls such as age, age squared, a set of dummies for educational 
attainment, states, metropolitan status, and marital status.  The omitted category in the set of ethnic 
dummy variables is British.  
In the second step we estimate the following specification by least squares:
34 
                           e r r o r  (24) 
where       is the set of estimated coefficients     in regression (23) and Individualism is Hofstede’s 
individualism score. Our theory predicts that   should be positive.  
Table 9 presents estimates from regression (24). Note that the estimate of   is larger when we 
constrain the sample only to U.S. born persons and when we consider persons with a certain educational 
threshold. The estimates of   indicate that persons coming from individualistic cultures are more likely to 
take research-oriented occupations than persons from collectivist cultures. Obviously, these estimates do 
not prove that persons from individualist cultures are more successful at innovation than persons from 
collectivist cultures but they clearly suggest that there is a cultural component at work in the choice of 
such occupations.  
10. Concluding remarks 
Our key finding is that individualistic culture has a strong causal effect on economic development, 
shedding new light on what determines the wealth of nations. The effect of individualism on long-run 
growth is robust and quantitatively important even after accounting for a variety of alternative theories. 
This result has a number of implications for positive and normative economics.   
There are clearly many pitfalls that should be avoided in interpreting our results. By no means 
should our (or any other) research on economic effects of culture be seen as implying a “ranking” of 
cultures in the world or a need for cultural revolutions. On the contrary, this research is aimed to better 
understand the tradeoffs implied by different cultures which are deeply rooted in history and change very 
slowly. We must better understand the world we live in and the values and beliefs upon which people in 
                                                            
34 To minimize the effect of outliers, we use Huber robust least squares regression.  26 
 
different countries base their expectations, judgments and calculations. Identifying effects of culture on 
economic outcomes should be interpreted in a way that leads to better dialogue and communication across 
cultures.   
On a more practical side, this research can help pinpoint effective margins of development policy 
and aid programs to developing countries. Depending on the strengths of various cultures, different 
emphases may have to be put on a spectrum of available policy tools. For example, in collectivist 
societies, aid for programs providing public goods may be more effective than in individualist countries. 
In the latter, aid programs counting on local initiatives might be more effective. Alternatively, 
organizational support may have to be stronger for infrastructure projects in individualist societies, 
whereas in collectivist societies one may have to make special effort to encourage creative initiatives.   
Research on the economic effects of culture is still in its infancy. We hope that our results 
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Table 1. Income and individualism. 
 OLS    IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)    (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Continent  dummies  No Yes No Yes    No Yes No Yes 
Controls  No No Yes  Yes    No No Yes  Yes 
Panel A: Log income per worker 
Individualism  0.027*** 0.024*** 0.016*** 0.020***   0.031*** 0.037*** 0.025*** 0.034*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)   (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Observations  76 76 76 76    76 76 76 76 
R
2  0.374 0.616 0.479 0.643    0.365 0.570 0.455 0.598 
1
st  stage  F-stat        42.97 19.70 19.96 13.47 
1
st stage partial R
2         0.388 0.308 0.301 0.260 
Panel B: Total factor productivity from Hall and Jones (1999) 
Individualism  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.007**  0.011***   0.016***  0.019*** 0.016*** 0.020*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)   (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations  66 66 66 66    66 66 66 66 
R
2  0.170 0.326 0.270 0.422    0.140 0.288 0.217 0.376 
1
st  stage  F-stat        42.40  17.78  20.06  13.21 
1
st stage partial R
2         0.418  0.324  0.338  0.292 
Panel C: Total factor productivity from Jones and Romer (2010) 
Individualism  0.018*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.011***   0.023*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.017*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)   (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Observations  53 53 53 53    53 53 53 53 
R
2  0.404 0.674 0.629 0.728    0.379 0.663 0.596 0.706 
1
st  stage  F-stat        37.64  16.69  18.02  11.03 
1
st stage partial R
2         0.452  0.350  0.353  0.306 
Panel D: Log patents per capita 
Individualism  0.095*** 0.093*** 0.076*** 0.084***   0.103*** 0.134*** 0.102*** 0.132*** 
  (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)   (0.024) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) 
Observations  63 63 63 63    63 63 63 63 
R
2  0.420 0.546 0.637 0.667    0.418 0.500 0.618 0.617 
1
st  stage  F-stat        39.19  15.79  16.44  10.89 
1
st stage partial R
2         0.397  0.279  0.311  0.261 
Panel E: Innovation performance index 
Individualism  0.060*** 0.059*** 0.048*** 0.053***   0.066*** 0.086*** 0.066*** 0.084*** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008)   (0.015) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) 
Observations  63 63 63 63    63 63 63 63 
R
2  0.429 0.553 0.642 0.672    0.425 0.503 0.621 0.617 
1
st  stage  F-stat        39.19  15.79  16.44  10.89 
1
st stage partial R
2         0.397  0.279  0.311  0.261 
Notes: In Panel A, the dependent variable is log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker from the Penn World Tables. In 
Panels B and C, the dependent variable is log total factor productivity relative to the USA from Hall and Jones (1999) and from Jones 
and Romer (2010). In Panels D and E, the dependent variables are innovation performance index and log patents per million 
population taken from Economist Intelligence Unit (2007, 2009). Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of 
the index corresponds to a greater level of individualism. The instrument is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and 
B in a given country relative to the frequency of blood types A and B in the USA.  Controls include a dummy for landlocked 
countries, the percentage of Muslims in a country and absolute values of country longitude and latitude. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 31 
 
Table 2. Income and individualism by region. 
 





Asia  OECD  non-
OECD 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Panel A: OLS 
Individualism  0.035*  0.022*** 0.062*** 0.017*** 0.031*** 0.046*** 0.016*** 0.033*** 
  (0.017)  (0.005) (0.012) (0.003) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.008) 
           
Observations  19  26 11 17 56 30 29 46 
R-squared  0.192  0.376 0.611 0.524 0.626 0.531 0.298 0.483 
           
Panel B: IV 
Individualism  0.061**  0.045**  0.080*  0.021*** 0.059*** 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.054*** 
  (0.027)  (0.021) (0.046) (0.005) (0.018) (0.024) (0.009) (0.017) 
           
Observations  19  26 11 17 56 30 29 46 
R-squared  0.087  -0.074 0.553 0.482 0.495 0.487 0.122 0.413 
1st  stage  F-stat  6.874  2.572 4.563 8.962 11.65 10.59 6.609 14.52 
Partial  R2  0.352  0.157 0.232 0.441 0.200 0.299 0.318 0.250 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker from the Penn World Tables. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level of 
individualism. The instrument is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a given country 
relative to the frequency of blood types A and B in the USA.  Columns (5)-(8) include continent dummies. Robust 































  (1) (2) (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Individualism  0.030*** 0.043***  0.035*** 0.040***  0.058*** 0.058***  0.019*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) (0.011)   (0.013) (0.013)   (0.005) (0.005) 
               
Observations  76  76  76  37  76  76  40  40 
R
2  0.369 0.285 0.348  0.225    -0.130  -0.134    0.421  0.419 
1
st  stage  F-stat  46.33  28.57  59.12  20.26  16.99  15.01  47.77  42.45 
1
st stage partial R
2 0.396  0.384  0.445  0.397  0.213  0.210  0.558  0.666 
Over-id p-value    0.520            0.196 
 
Notes: the dependent variable log income per worker (at purchasing power parity) is from the Penn World Tables. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level of 
individualism. In column (1), Blood Distance is computed with the Mahalanobis metric (instead of Euclidean). In 
column (2), we use raw frequencies (i.e., no distance) of blood types A and B as separate instruments. Over-id p-
value is the p-value for the overidentifying restrictions test. In column (3), Blood Distance is computed relative to 
the United Kingdom (instead of the USA). In column (4), Blood Distance (relative to the USA) is computed based 
on data available from the Red Cross and similar agencies. In columns (5) and (6), the distance between nations is 
taken from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) who use a broader set of genetic polymorphisms. The first and Nei 
genetic distances for a given gene are computed as follows. Let pij be the frequency of gene i with L alleles in 
populations j=1,2. Then the first distance is  
2 2
1() / ( 1 )
ST ij i i i j F pp p p
     where 
1
12 2 ()
ii i pp p   and the Nei 
distance is
1/2
12 11 22 log{ / ( ) }
N FJ J J   where 
12 1 2 11
LL
km km J pp
    and 
2
1 1, { 1 , 2 }
L
dd md m Jp d
    . See 
Table 1.10.1 in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) for a more detailed description of how the first and Nei genetic distances 
are constructed. In columns (7) and (8), the linguistic instrument Pronoun drop dummy is a dummy variable (from 
Licht et al. 2007) equal to one if a language permits dropping a pronoun in sentences and zero others. In column (7), 
only Pronoun drop dummy is used as an instrumental variable. In column (8), Pronoun drop dummy and Blood 
Distance are instrumental variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
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Table 4. Effect of culture on growth with direct impact of genes on culture. 
 Instrumental  variables 
  Frequency of short (S) allele 
in the polymorphic region 
5HTTLPR of serotonin 
transporter gene (SLC6A4) 
 
Frequency of G allele in 
polymorphism A118G  
in -opoid receptor gene 















  (1) (2)    (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
Second stage: regression of log output per worker on individualism 
Individualism 0.023**  0.031***    0.019***  0.023***    0.043***  0.039*** 
 (0.011)  (0.011)    (0.006)  (0.006)   (0.006)  (0.005) 
             
First stage: regression of individualism on IV 
Alternative IV  -1.127***  -0.657**    -178.442***  -104.188*    -24.769***  -19.533*** 
 (0.230)  (0.291)  (40.004)  (54.860)  (2.210)  (2.235) 
Blood  distance   -217.636*    -291.052**   -225.387*** 
   (113.051)    (112.610)    (58.228) 
Observations  30 30    23 23    73 73 
R
2  0.442 0.394    0.509 0.509    0.256 0.311 
1
st  stage  F-stat  23.88 18.26    19.90 30.23    125.5 75.66 
Over-id  test  p-value   0.261     0.473     0.206 
 
Notes: The dependent variable in the second stage is log output per worker from the Penn World Tables. Individualism is 
Hofstede’s index of individualism. The instrument in columns (1) and (2) is from Chiao and Blizinsky (2010), in columns (3) 
and (4) from Way and Lieberman (2010), in columns (5) and (6) from Fincher et al. (2008). In columns (1), (3), and (5) the 
set of instrumental variables does not include blood distance from the USA. In columns (2), (4), and (6) the set of 
instrumental variables includes the blood distance from the USA and an alternative instrumental variable shown in the 
heading of the column. Over-id test p-value reports the p-value for the overidentifying restriction tests that instruments are 





Table 5. Income and alternative measures of individualism (Schwartz). 
  OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Embeddedness  -1.889***  -2.208***      
  (0.194)  (0.412)      
Affective  autonomy    1.293***  1.545***    
    (0.150)  (0.310)    
Intellectual  autonomy      1.728***  2.813*** 
      (0.219)  (0.626) 
Observations  73 73 73 73 73 73 
R
2  0.599 0.582 0.533 0.513 0.461 0.279 
1
st  stage  F-stat   27.27  23.38  20.19 
1
st stage partial R
2   0.235  0.252  0.157 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker from the Penn World Tables. 
Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions independently. 
Affective autonomy encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. In 
Embeddedness cultures, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. A larger value of Intellectual 
autonomy and Affective autonomy corresponds to a greater level of individualism. A smaller value of Embeddedness 
corresponds to a greater level of individualism. Schwartz’s Intellectual autonomy, Affective autonomy, and 
Embeddedness are taken from Licht et al. (2007). The instrument is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood 
types A and B in a given country relative to the frequency of blood types A and B in the USA.  Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
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Table 6. Relative effects of institutions and culture on economic development. 
Panel A: Control for protection against expropriation risks. 
 OLS    IV 
  (1) (2) (3)    (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Individualism  0.012***   0.027***  0.024*** 0.031*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 















  (0.016) (0.015)     (0.020) (0.016) (0.020) (0.014) 
Continent  dummies  No No No    No Yes No Yes 
Controls  No No No    No No Yes  Yes 
Observations  76 76 76    76 76 76 76 
R
2  0.723 0.666 0.374    0.665 0.746 0.708 0.781 
1
st  stage  F-stat          38.44 20.89 20.18 13.96 
1
st stage partial R
2          0.393 0.297 0.301 0.255 
 
Panel B: Instrument and control for protection against expropriation risks 
 OLS 
 IV 


















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (7) (8) (9) 
Individualism 0.021***    0.007*   0.033***   0.025**    0.024* 















   (0.023)  (0.024)      (0.038) (0.069) (0.059) (0.125) 
Observations  35 35 35    35 35 35 35 35 
R
2  0.215  0.675  0.696  0.151  0.640  0.564  0.574  0.573 
1
st  stage:                    
F-stat          14.88  7.964  4.424  3.654 
Partial R
2          0.424  0.424  0.174  0.185 
F-stat            12.01  14.13  10.66 
Partial R
2          0.377  0.553  0.482 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker from the Penn World Tables. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level of 
individualism. Protection against expropriation risk , taken from the International Country Risk Guide, is averaged 
between 1985 and 2009. It is the same variable Acemoglu et al. (2001) used to approximate the strength of a 
country’s institutions. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater strength of institutions. The instrument is 
blood distance, the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a given country relative to the 
frequency of blood types A and B in the USA. The instrument for institutions (Economic Risk) is Settler mortality 
from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Settler mortality (Albouy) from Albouy (2008). The Instrumented variables are in 





Table 7. Effect of individualism after using extended controls. 
  Log income per worker    Log patents per capita    Log TFP 
(Hall and Jones, 1999) 
  OLS IV    OLS IV    OLS IV 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
Individualism 0.008**  0.017**   0.048***  0.118***    0.010**  0.021** 
 (0.004)  (0.007)   (0.016)  (0.037)    (0.005)  (0.009) 
Trust -0.399  -0.536*    -1.167 -1.757    -0.519  -0.689* 
 (0.289)  (0.286)    (1.361)  (1.360)  (0.443) (0.396) 
Protection against 
expropriation  risk  0.097*** 0.096***    0.351*** 0.353***    0.100*** 0.103*** 
 (0.015)  (0.014)    (0.080)  (0.080)  (0.025) (0.021) 
Education index  2.700***  2.096***    8.430**  2.609    -1.072  -2.097* 
 (0.558)  (0.563)    (4.128)  (3.168)  (1.068) (1.254) 
Ethnic fractionalization  -0.217  -0.336   -1.139  -1.992   -0.461 -0.588 
 (0.272)  (0.280)    (1.267)  (1.374)  (0.422) (0.388) 
Log geographic distance 
from the UK  -0.091  -0.008    0.002  0.751    -0.105  -0.002 
 (0.128)  (0.128)    (0.487)  (0.629)  (0.148) (0.145) 
Legal  origin               
French  0.132 0.235    -0.407 0.739    0.141  0.282 
 (0.140)  (0.154)    (0.666)  (0.836)  (0.210) (0.226) 
German  -0.183  -0.025   0.143  1.821   -0.381 -0.189 
 (0.207)  (0.204)    (1.298)  (1.152)  (0.312) (0.303) 
Scandinavian  -0.170 0.047    0.460 2.014    -0.014  0.255 
 (0.292)  (0.314)    (1.293)  (1.450)  (0.433) (0.435) 
Observations  62  62  53  53  56  56 
R-squared  0.926  0.916  0.870  0.813  0.703  0.672 
1st stage F-stat    11.02      5.235      6.714 
Partial  R2   0.236     0.169     0.193 
Notes: the dependent variable is log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker from the Penn World Tables. 
Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism in columns (1) to (4) and log patents per million population 
taken from Economist Intelligence Unit (2007, 2009) in columns (5) to (8). A larger value of the index corresponds 
to a greater level of individualism. The instrument is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a 
given country relative to the frequency of blood types A and B in the USA.  Legal origin is from La Porta et al. 
(2002). British legal origin is the omitted category. Protection against expropriation risk, taken from the 
International Country Risk Guide, is averaged between 1985 and 2009. It is the same variable Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) used to approximate the strength of a country’s institutions. A larger value of the index corresponds to a 
greater strength of institutions.  Trust is percent of people agreeing  that strangers can generally be trusted from the 
World Values Survey. Education index is for 2000 from the Human Development of the World Bank. Ethnic 
fractionalization is from Fearon (2003). Geographic distance from the UK is population weighted distance taken 
from CEPII database (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm).  All regression include controls (a 
dummy for landlocked countries, the percentage of Muslims in a country and absolute values of country longitude 
and latitude) and continent dummies. The Instrumented variables are in bold italic. Robust standard errors in 







Table 8. Causal effects between culture and institutions. 
 OLS    IV 
  (1)    (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable = Protection against expropriation risk; Instrument = Blood Distance 
 
Individualism  0.073***   0.061* 0.107**  0.070* 0.116** 
 (0.019)    (0.035)  (0.043) (0.040) (0.051) 
Continent  dummies No    No Yes No Yes 
Controls No    No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  35    35 35 35 35 
R
2  0.163    0.159 0.366 0.277 0.359 
1
st  stage  F-stat     12.01 9.046 12.31 6.683 
1
st stage partial R
2     0.377 0.340 0.316 0.281 
         














 (1.134)  (1.620)  (1.912) (1.862) (1.614) 
Continent  dummies No    No Yes No Yes 
Controls No    No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  35    35 35 35 35 
R
2  0.163    -0.102 0.123 0.045 0.364 
1
st  stage  F-stat     14.88 6.101 7.003 4.880 
1
st stage partial R
2     0.424 0.272 0.273 0.240 
         














 (0.019)  (2.732)  (3.146) (3.824) (2.944) 
Continent  dummies No    No Yes No Yes 
Controls No    No  No  Yes  Yes 
Observations  35    35 35 35 35 
R
2  0.163    -0.362 0.130 -0.063 0.373 
1
st  stage  F-stat     4.424 2.100 1.789 1.383 
1
st stage partial R
2     0.174 0.116 0.102  0.0896 
 
Notes: Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level 
of individualism. Economic risk is from the International Country Risk Guide which Acemoglu et al. (2001) used to 
approximate the strength of a country’s institutions. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater strength of 
institutions. Blood distance is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in a given country relative 
to the frequency of blood types A and B in the USA. The instrument for institutions (Economic Risk) is Settler 
mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001) and Settler mortality (Albouy) from Albouy (2008). Controls includes a 
dummy for Muslim countries, a dummy for landlocked countries, and absolute values of country longitude and 
latitude.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. 
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Table 9. Propensity to choose research-oriented occupations in the USA. 
  Narrow definition of research occupations    Broad definition of research occupations 
 
Persons with 




















 (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
Panel A: U.S. born persons 
Individualism 0.007*** 0.022***  0.195***    0.023** 0.070***  0.355*** 
 (0.003)  (0.006)  (0.044)   (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.060) 
Observations 67  67  57    67  67  57 
R-squared 0.111  0.191  0.267    0.058  0.142  0.386 
              
Panel B: All persons 
Individualism 0.004*** 0.013***  0.105**  0.019** 0.029  0.110* 
 (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.049)  (0.009) (0.018) (0.060) 
Observations 67  67  67    67  67  67 
R-squared 0.102  0.149  0.066    0.071  0.036  0.050 
 
Notes: The table report Huber-robust estimate of parameter θ in specification (24). The dependent variable is the set 
of estimated coefficients αk from regression. Huber-robust regression is used in estimation. Individualism is 
Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level of individualism. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels. Narrow definition of research oriented occupations includes 
Life, Physical, and Social Science Occupations (codes 160-196 in the 2000 census occupational classification 
system recorded in the IPUMS variable OCC). Narrow definition of research oriented occupations includes Narrow 
definition of research oriented occupations and Architecture and Engineering Occupations (codes 130-156 in the 
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Figure 3. Individualism and economic outcomes. 
  
 
Notes: Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level 
of individualism. Log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker is from the Penn World Tables. Log total 
factor productivity relative to the USA is from Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2010). Log patents per 
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Notes: Log income (at purchasing power parity) per worker is from the Penn World Tables. Log total factor 
productivity relative to the USA is from Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones and Romer (2010). Log patents per million 
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Figure 5. Genetic and cultural distance 
 
 
Notes: Individualism is Hofstede’s index of individualism. A larger value of the index corresponds to a greater level 
of individualism. Intellectual autonomy encourages individuals to pursue their own ideas and intellectual directions 
independently. Affective autonomy encourages individuals to pursue affectively positive experience for themselves. 
In Embeddedness cultures, people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. A larger value of Intellectual 
autonomy and Affective autonomy corresponds to a greater level of individualism. A smaller value of Embeddedness 
corresponds to a greater level of individualism. Schwartz’s Intellectual autonomy, Affective autonomy, and 
Embeddedness are taken from Licht et al. (2007). Blood distance to USA is the Euclidian distance of frequency of 
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Proof of proposition 1: 
In the symmetric equilibrium we have  
1
tt t t YL F x
  
   (A.1) 
11 1
tt t t pL F x
  
    (A.2) 
(1 ) / tt t wY L    (A.3) 
21 2
tt t t t x LF x Y
   
   (A.4) 
(1 ) tt t t t p xx Y      (A.5) 
(1 ) tt GY   (A.6) 
[1 (1 )] ttt t CYG Y      (A.7) 
1/ tt Cq     (A.8) 
11 (1 ) tt t qr q       (A.9) 
1 (1 ) tt t t t LF q w         (A.10) 
 
12 1 1
11 (1 ) (1 ) tt t t t t t t FL q L F x
        
 
       (A.11) 
21 11 tt t LF x
  
   (A.12) 
1 (1 ) tt t FL F     (A.13) 
Using (A.3), (A.8) and (A.10), we have  
11 1
11 11 ( 1 ) / ( 1 ) 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) [1 (1 )] [1 (1 )] (1 )
tt t
t
tt t tt t t tt
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 
 
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. (A.14) 
Plus this expression for  t   into (A.11) to find 
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On a balanced growth path, we have  t LL   and thus 
 
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Note that (1 ) / L L   is monotonically decreasing in L. We can then derive: 























The downward bias on an instrumented variable when several variables need to be instrumented. 
Suppose that the link between economic variable Y, culture C and institutions I is given by the following 
setup 
    C        (B.1) 
         (B.2) 
           (B.3) 
where equation (B.1) shows the effect of culture and institutions on economic outcomes (e.g., income per 
worker), equation (B.2) captures the first-stage for culture with D being exogenous genetic distance, 
equation (B.3) reflects the first stage regression for institutions with Q being exogenous (to economic 
outcomes) factors affecting the spread of institutions. We assume that  
  0 ,  0  which means that culture and institutions both positively affect economic outcomes,  
cov  ,    0  which means that factors affecting the spread of culture and institutions (or similar 
factors) are positively correlated, 
     ,    0 ,        ,    0 ,        ,    0  which captures the endogeneity of culture and institutions. 
The positive correlations mean that unobservables move economic outcomes, institutions and 
culture in the same direction.  
We have a good instrument for culture (i.e., D) but for variables that measure institutions (or 
maybe other factors such as trust, rule of law, etc.) it may be hard to come by a good instrument which 
has a good coverage of countries. For example, settle mortality applies only to colonies and excludes 
European countries. Hence, the question is what would happen with an estimate of   if we instrument 
only culture.  
Using the facts that                                    , we can show that if            (rather 
than               ) then  
         
              ,        ,  
                  
                          
      
       
   
      
       
   
 
   (B.4) 
where      
     ,  
             ,      
     ,  
             ,    
   is the R
2 in equation (B.2),    
   is the R
2 in equation (B.3). 
The numerator in the bias term in equation (B.4) is unambiguously positive. The sign of the 
denominator depends on the strength of correlations between error terms as well as correlation between D 
and Q and the relative strength of the fit in the first stage regressions (B.2) and (B.3). We can assess 
empirically if this term is positive. Specifically, the R
2 is the first stage fit is about 0.2 – 0.3 in both 
regressions (B.2) and (B.3) so that the range for  
      
       
   
      
       
   
 is 0.5 to 1.5 at most. The correlation 
between error terms in the first stage is 0.3. The correlation between predicted values of C and I (which 
would correspond to D and Q) is 0.1. Hence, the bias in unambiguously downward.  
To conclude, if we do not instrument institutions or any other variable which satisfies conditions 
we spell out above, we would have a negative bias in the estimates. If the bias is downward and we still 




Questions from Hofstede’s survey used to identify individualism (source Exhibit 5.11 in Hofstede 
(2001)): 
1.  Have challenging work to do – work from which you can get a personal sense of accomplishment 
[challenge]. 
2.  Live in an area desirable to you and your family [desirable area]. 
3.  Have an opportunity of high earnings [earnings]. 
4.  Work with people who cooperate well with one another [cooperation]. 
5.  Have training opportunities (to improve your skills and to learn new skills) [training]. 
6.  Have good fringe benefits [benefits]. 
7.  Get recognition you deserve when you do a good job [recognition]. 
8.  Have good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate work space, etc.) 
[physical conditions]. 
9.  Have considerable freedom to adapt your own approach to the job [freedom]. 
10. Have the security that you will be able to work for your company as long as you want to 
[employment security]. 
11. Have an opportunity for advancement to higher level jobs [advancement]. 
12. Have a good working relationship with your manager [manager]. 
13. Fully  use your skills and abilities on the job [use of skills]. 
14. Have a job which leaves you sufficient time for your personal or family life [personal time]. 
15. Have the security that you will not be transferred to a less desirable job [position security]. 
16. Work in a department which is run efficiently [efficient department]. 
17. Have a job which allows you to make a real contribution to the success of your company 
[contribute to company]. 
18. Work in a company which is regarded in your country as successful [successful company]. 
19. Work in a company which stands in the forefront of modern technology [modern company]. 
20. Work in a congenial and friendly atmosphere [friendly atmosphere]. 
21. Keep up to date with the technical developments relating to your work [up-to-dateness]. 
22. Have a job on which there is a great deal of day-to-day learning [day-to-day learning]. 
23. Have little tension and stress on the job [stress-free]. 
24. Be consulted by your direct supervisor in his/her decisions [consulted]. 
25. Make a real contribution to the success of your company or organization [contribute]. 
26. Serve your country [country]. 
27. Have an element of variety and adventure in the job [variety]. 
28. Work in a prestigious, successful company or organization [prestige]. 
29. Have an opportunity for helping other people [helping]. 
30. Work in a well-defined job situation where requirement are clear [clear job]. 
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APPENDIX D: Tables 
 
Appendix Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Explanatory variables           
Individualism 78  41.717  22.980  6  91 
Trust 114  51.453  28.210  7.900  148 
Education index  147  0.764  0.197  0.118  0.993 
Ethnic fractionalization  152  0.470  0.258  0.002  1 
Log geographic distance from the UK  164  8.426  0.812  5.382  9.826 
Protection against expropriation risk  138  33.728  5.777  16.5  44.96 
          
Instrumental variables            
Pronoun drop  41  .560  0.502  0  1 
Euclidian genetic distance from the USA  156  0.086  0.038  0  0.185 
Mahalanobis genetic distance from the USA  156  1.504  0.660  0  3.163 
Euclidian genetic distance from the UK  156  0.102  0.048  0  0.212 
Mahalanobis genetic distance from the UK  156  1.752  0.809  0  3.586 
          
Economic outcome variables           
Log income per worker  153  9.246  1.187  6.785  11.648 
Log patents per million of population  81  0.705  3.363  -7.600  7.126 
Innovation performance index  81  6.224  2.107  1.440  10 
Log TFP relative to the USA           
Hall and Jones (1999)  117  -0.893  0.713  -2.538  0.188 






Appendix Table 2. Long-term growth, 1500-2001 and 1820-2001. 
 OLS    IV 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
            
Controls  No Yes No No    No Yes No No 
Continent  dummies  No No Yes No    No No Yes No 
            
  Panel A: 1500-2001 
Individualism  0.028*** 0.016*** 0.015**  0.015**    0.040***  0.042* 0.023* 0.036*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)   (0.011) (0.023) (0.013) (0.013) 
Protection against 
expropriation risk 
   
0.102***       0.043 
     ( 0 . 0 2 4 )        ( 0 . 0 4 1 )  
Observations  31 31 31 31   31 31 31 31 
R-squared  0.479 0.683 0.684 0.678   0.375 0.446 0.661 0.486 
1st  stage  F-stat        14.12  3.414  3.797  8.639 
Partial R
2        0.466  0.292  0.200  0.420 
  
Panel B: 1820-2001 
Individualism  0.017***  0.009* 0.009**  0.006*   0.025*** 0.028**  0.017*  0.020*** 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003)   (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.007) 
Protection against 
expropriation risk 
   
0.100***       0.062** 
     ( 0 . 0 1 5 )        ( 0 . 0 2 7 )  
Observations  46 46 46 46   46 46 46 46 
R-squared  0.293 0.464 0.448 0.595   0.226 0.251 0.411 0.446 
1st  stage  F-stat        28.16  8.695  10.11  19.41 
Partial R
2        0.456  0.283  0.269  0.437 
 
Notes: the dependent variable is log growth rate of income per capita from Maddison (2003). Individualism is 
Hofstede’s index of individualism. The instrument is the Euclidian distance of frequency of blood types A and B in 
a given country relative to the frequency of blood types A and B in the USA.  Protection against expropriation risk, 
taken from the International Country Risk Guide, is averaged between 1985 and 2009. It is the same variable 
Acemoglu et al. (2001) used to approximate the strength of a country’s institutions. A larger value of the index 
corresponds to a greater strength of institutions.  The instrumented variables are in bold. Robust standard errors in 




APPENDIX E: Figures 
 
Map of the Mahalanobis distance of frequency of blood types A and B relative to the UK. 
 
 
 